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INTRODUCTION
Margaret Lancaster jumped to her death from the MemphisArkansas bridge.' She had been the victim of domestic abuse for a
prolonged period of time. 2 Her abuser had, among other things,
broken her leg, burned her with cigarettes, and beaten her to the point
that she was bruised over large areas of her body.3 In her suicide note,
Lancaster wrote to her mother that she was taking her own life
because she could no longer take the abuse. 4 After Lancaster's suicide,
her son and mother brought a wrongful death action against her

*

College
1.
2.
3.
4.

Williford Gragg Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
of Law.
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tenn. 1965).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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abuser.5 Despite the sustained period of abuse and the suicide note
linking Lancaster's death to that abuse, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held as a matter of law that the defendant's actions were not a
6
proximate cause of Lancaster's death.
The court's decision in this case, Lancaster v. Montesi, decided in
1965, went on to become one of the leading cases in situations in which
a defendant's actions are alleged to have resulted in the suicide of the
decedent.7 Although Lancasterwas decided over fifty years ago, many
courts have committed themselves to a rule that would produce the
same result today under similar facts. Known as "the suicide rule" in
at least one jurisdiction,8 the strict version of the rule provides that,
as a matter of law, there can be no liability for causing the suicide of
another individual unless the decedent was acting pursuant to a
9
delirium or insanity caused by the defendant's negligence.
As this Essay explains, Tennessee courts played a significant role
in the early development of this rule. Therefore, it is perhaps fitting
that over fifty years after Lancaster, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has issued a decision that dramatically weakens the suicide rule. This
decision, Cotten v. Wilson,' 0 along with the court's previous decision
in a similar case, White v. Lawrence," have the potential to reshape
the discussion among other courts concerning liability for negligence
that leads to suicide.
Suicide is currently the tenth leading cause of death in the United
2
States, with over 40,000 deaths a year attributed to suicide.1 The
suicide rate in the United States increased 33% between 1999 and
2017.13 In light of this growing public health concern, it is incumbent

5. Id.
6. Id. at 222.
7. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
8. See Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2009)
(referring to the "Illinois 'suicide rule').
9. See Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994)
("Indiana decisions hold that suicide constitutes an intervening cause, as a matter of
law, if committed by one who is sane enough to realize the effect of his actions.").
10. 576 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2019).
11. 975 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998).
12. See Hannah Nichols, What Are the Leading Causes of Death in the US?, MED.
82929
.php;
NEWS TODAY (July 4, 2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.comlarticles/2
TIMES
N.Y.
High,
30-Year
a
to
Surges
Rate
Suicide
U.S.
Tavernise,
see also Sabrina
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/health/us-suicide-rate-surges-toa-30-year-high.html (reporting that over 40,000 people died from suicide in 2014).
13. Holly Hedegaard, Sally C. Curtin & Margaret Warner, Suicide Mortality in
the United States, 1999-2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov.
33
0.htm.
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db
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upon courts to develop legal rules that reflect the realities associated
with suicide. This Essay traces the origins of the modern tort rules
regarding suicide to early religious views on the subject, which, in
turn, shaped common law forfeiture principles. The Essay then
examines nineteenth and early twentieth century life insurance
decisions from Tennessee and other jurisdictions involving suicide
that ultimately shaped twentieth century tort law. Finally, the Essay
explores Tennessee's evolving tort law on the subject and how the
evolving Tennessee view might perhaps usher in a new approach
among other courts.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SUICIDE RULE
The basic rule from Lancaster, that a defendant's negligence is not
the proximate cause of another's suicide, was already well-established
at the time of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Lancasterin
1965.14 In 1881, the United States Supreme Court decided the case oL.
Scheffer v. Railroad Co.1 5 Scheffer suffered serious physical injuries,
in a train crash and eventually took his own life. 16 In a subsequent
wrongful death action against the railroad company, Scheffer's
executors alleged that the negligence of the train company caused
Scheffer's suicide.1 7 The Supreme Court sustained the defendant's
demurrer, concluding that the proximate cause of Scheffer's death,
"was his own act of self-destruction."18 The suicide was "not a result.
naturally and reasonably to be expected from the injury received on
the train."1 9 As such, "it could not have been foreseen in the light of
the circumstances attending the negligence of the officers in charge of
the train."20
Scheffer helped establish the general rule in cases in which a
defendant's affirmative act of negligence is alleged to have resulted in
the suicide of another. Under the general rule, suicide is treated as an
unforeseeable consequence of a defendant's negligence and is
therefore the efficient or superseding cause of death. 2 1 Many courts

14. See Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965).
15. 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
16. Id. at 250.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 252.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("[Tlhe
practically unanimous rule is that [suicide] is a new and independent agency which
does not come within and complete a line of causation from the wrongful act to the
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state the rule in more absolute terms: suicide is not sometimes or
22

potentially a superseding cause; suicide is a superseding cause.
Therefore, under this strict version of the rule, there can be no liability
on the part of the defendant whose negligence was a factual cause of
23
the death absent an applicable exception.
Almost inextricably linked to this rule is the "delirium or insanity"
(or "rage or frenzy") exception. Under this exception, recovery is
permitted where the defendant's negligence results in "delirium or
insanity" (or "rage or frenzy") on the part of the decedent, which in
24
turn results in suicide. But if the decedent understood the nature of
the act and was able to resist the impulse to take their life, the suicide
25
rule generally prevents recovery from another individual.
As Part III of this Essay explains, this general rule and its
delirium or insanity exception have remained essentially unchanged
for well over a century. And as Part II below explains, the cultural
and legal origins of the rule go back centuries.
II. SUICIDE, FORFEITURE, AND SIN
The modern tort rules regarding suicide have their origins in
Judeo-Christian beliefs, common law principles of forfeiture, and pretwentieth century views of mental illness.
In the Middle Ages, the act of suicide was often viewed as the work
26
of Satan or demonic possession. Those who died by suicide were
denied Christian burial rights, and their bodies were subject to public

death and therefore does not render defendant liable for the suicide." (quoting C. T.
Drechsler, Annotation, Civil Liability for Death by Suicide, 11 A.L.R. 2d 751, 757
(1950))).
22. Id.; see, e.g., Chalhoub v. Dixon, 788 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
("[Sluicide is an independent intervening event that the tortfeasor cannot be expected
to foresee."); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994)
("Indiana decisions hold that suicide constitutes an intervening cause, as a matter of
law, if committed by one who is sane enough to realize the effect of his actions." (citing
Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1994))).
23. See Chalhoub, 788 N.E.2d at 168 ("It is well-established under Illinois law
that a plaintiff may not recover for a decedent's suicide following a tortious act.. . .").
24. See City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 577 (Ga. 2017) (stating
the exception in terms of rage or frenzy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 455 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating the delirium or insanity exception).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455.
26. See Alex B. Long, Abolishing the Suicide Rule, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 77374 (2019).
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mutilation as a warning to others. 2 7 St. Thomas Aquinas, writing in
Summa Theologiae, argued that suicide was a sin against God
because "life is a gift made to man by God," and God alone has the
power over life and death. 28
The law during this time viewed suicide not only as an offense to
God but an offense to the King. 29 Suicide was classified as a felony,
and one of the consequences of the offense was that the property of
the decedent was subject to forfeiture to the crown. 30 The blood of one
who committed such a felony was deemed to be corrupted, and their
family members could not inherit their property. 3 1 The exception to
this rule of forfeiture was where the suicide was the result of insanity.
If the decedent was insane at the time of death, the act of suicide was
not treated as being wrongful, so the individual's family members
could inherit the individual's property. 32 This rule obviously was of
potential benefit to the crown, but it also permitted wealthy families
to "persuade" medical coroners that the decedent was insane at the
time of suicide, thereby permitting family members to inherit. 33
English common law regarding suicide influenced American law
on the subject. A majority of the original colonies continued to classify
suicide as a felony, and some continued the practice of requiring
forfeiture in the case of suicide. 34 But in keeping with common law,
where suicide was deemed a crime, taking one's own life did not result
in forfeiture where the decedent was determined to be insane. 35
While suicide was still frequently viewed as an immoral act,
societal attitudes regarding suicide evolved during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Suicide was no longer classified as a crime in

27. HOWARD I. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND: A
PsYCHOcuLTURAL BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SUICIDE 18-19 (1989).
28. GEORGE HOWE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 159 (1991) (quoting 38 ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 33 (Marcus Lefebure ed. & trans.,
Blackfriars 1975)).
29. See Hales v. Petit (1562) 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (KB) (explaining that suicide
is an offense against God and the King).
30. See Helen Y. Chang, A Brief History of Anglo-Western Suicide: From Legal
Wrong to Civil Right, 46 S.U. L. REv. 150, 160 (2018); Long, supra note 26, at 778.
31. See Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (describing the corruption
of blood concept at common law).
32. See Chang, supra note 30, at 162.
33. See id. at 163 ("In addition, the financial incentive for coroners to find a
suicide worked in the reverse for the wealthy who may have offered the coroner a share
of the goods, escaping forfeiture, in exchange for a finding of non-compos mentis.").
34. See Long, supra note 26, at 778.
35. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711-13 (1997) (summarizing
the law of the time).
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36
the majority of colonies by the end of the eighteenth century. During
the nineteenth century, suicide increasingly became associated with
insanity, with one journal suggesting that the majority of suicide
37
cases actually resulted from insanity.
The judicial decisions of the time reflect the prevailing societal
attitudes on the subject of suicide. The decisions contain numerous
38
But they also
references to the supposed immorality of suicide.
terms-prevailing
pejorative
and
frightening
reflect-in sometimes
societal views concerning mental illness and the supposed connection
39
between suicide and uncontrollable impulses.

III. SUICIDE AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES IN THE NINETEENTH AND
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The modern tort rules involving suicide have some of their roots
in nineteenth and early twentieth century insurance cases. In these
cases, insurance companies would refuse to pay the proceeds of a life
insurance policy to the family members of an individual who had died
by suicide. In some instances, the policies were silent on the subject
of non-payment in the event of suicide, but others. contained an
exclusion barring payment if the decedent "shall die by suicide, or by
his own hands." 40 There were a remarkable number of these cases
during this time, and the question in them frequently came down to
the issue of whether the decedent was "insane" at the time of the
suicide.
For example, in Phadenhauerv. Germania Life Ins. Co., an 1872
Tennessee decision, an insurance company denied recovery to a widow
4
on the grounds that the decedent had taken his own life. 1 The policy

&

36. See GEORGES MINOis, HISTORY OF SUICIDE: VOLUNTARY DEATH IN WESTERN
CULTURE 297 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1995); see
also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713-14.
37. See Long, supra note 26, at 776 (stating that "in most cases of suicide, 'the
individual was known to be melancholy, and partially insane."' (quoting Cases of
Insanity, Illustratingthe Importance of Early Treatment in PreventingSuicide, 1 AM.
J. INSANITY 243, 243 (1845))).
38. See, e.g., Life Ass'n of Am. v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533, 537 (1876) (discussing the
moral element involved in suicide); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877)
(referring to suicide as a "sinful and immoral act").
39. See, e.g., Eastabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224, 224 (1866)
(discussing suicide in terms of an irresistible impulse); Breasted v. Farmers' Loan
Tr. Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 305 (1853) (describing decedent as a madman).
40. Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. 567, 570 (1872).
41.

Id.
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contained the common exclusion denying recovery in the case of
suicide. 4 2 In deciding whether the insurer was nonetheless required
to make payment, the Tennessee Supreme Court first looked to
English common law, which took the position that suicide "'by an
insane man or a lunatic, is not an act of suicide within the meaning of
the law."' 43 As suicide remained "a crime of the highest grade" in
Tennessee, the court then looked to criminal law to help define the
concept of insanity. 4 4 While noting that there were conflicting
conceptions of insanity under the law, the court concluded that "the
decided preponderance" of the authorities took the position that one
who was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong was insane and
thus could not legally commit the crime of suicide. 45 Accordingly, the
fact that one was "insane" in the sense of not being able to appreciate
the wrongfulness of taking one's own life permitted the survivors to
collect under a life insurance policy. 46
While Tennessee courts took the position that the inability to
distinguish right from wrong would "excuse" an individual's suicide,
other courts focused on whether the deceased was "incapable of using
a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing." 47
Drawing upon the other strand of criminal law's insanity defense, 48
these courts focused on whether the deceased was capable of
understanding the nature and consequence of the action. 49
Eventually, the Supreme Court agreed with the prevailing view,
among state courts that one who took their own life and was insane
at the time did not commit suicide under the terms of an insurance

42. Id.
43. Id. at 575 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189). Other
courts in the United States in the nineteenth century repeated this same rule. See,
e.g., Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 4 Hill 73, 75 (N.Y. 1843) ("Self-slaughter by
an insane man or a lunatic is not an act of suicide within the meaning of the law."
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 189)).
44. Phadenhauer,54 Tenn. at 576.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 577. Later policies apparently sought to avoid this result by providing
that a policy was void if the insured died "by his own hand or act, whether sane or
insane."Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Staples, 5 Tenn. App. 436, 439 (1927) (emphasis added);
see also Renfandt v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 419 P.3d 576, 579 (Colo. 2018) (discussing life
insurance policy exclusions for suicide, whether sane or insane).
47. See, e.g., Terry v. Life Ins. Co., 23 F. Cas. 856, 857 (Cir. Ct. D. Kan. 1871)
(No. 13,839).
48. See M'Naghten's Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (HL).
49. See Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 576 (noting the conflict among American
courts regarding the issue).
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50
contract, and the survivors therefore could recover. The Court

'

defined "insanity" in terms of the inability to understand the physical
5
consequences or the moral aspect of the act.
Regardless of the precise reasoning, the concept of "insanity" in
these cases was often defined by reference to an irresistible impulse
to take one's own life. In Phadenhauer,for example, the court agreed
with the earlier observation by the United States Circuit Court for
Kansas that if one was "impelled to the act by an insane impulse
which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist," the
52
individual was insane and the insurance company was liable.
Courts also gradually began to define the concept of insanity in
these insurance companies by reference to one acting pursuant to a
"frenzy." The term "frenzy" in this context most likely has its origins
in the Middle Ages' understanding of mental illness, which attributed
the condition of "frenzy" to the overheating of the brain, supposedly
caused by yellow bile. 53 Phadenhaueris noteworthy for being one of
the first United States decisions to articulate the link between suicide
and "frenzy." 54 Several state courts had already taken the position
that one who took one's own life "in a fit of delirium" had not died by
suicide. 55 In Phadenhauer,the circuit judge spoke in terms of "frenzy"

50. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.S. 121, 131 (1883).
51. Id.
52. Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 577 (quoting Terry, 23 F. Cas. at 857); see also
Dean v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 96, 101 (1862) (discussing a decedent's
suicide in terms of "an insane impulse").
53. See Long, supra note 26, at 774 (citing Claire Trenery & Peregrine Horden,
Madness in the Middle Ages, in THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF MADNESS AND MENTAL
HEALTH 62, 67 (Greg Eghigian ed., 2017)).
54. Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 571-72. Perhaps the first reported instance was
from an 1862 Massachusetts case, in which the court observed:
Doubtless there may be cases of delirium or raving madness
where the body acts only from frenzy or blind impulse, as there
are cases of idiocy or the decay of mental power, in which it acts
only from the promptings of the lowest animal instincts. But, in
the great majority of cases where reason has lost its legitimate
control, and the power of exercising a sound and healthy volition
is lost, the mind still retains sufficient power to supply motives
and exert a direct and essential control over the actions.
Dean, 86 Mass. at 100.
55. Eastabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224, 228 (1866) ("The
madman, who in a fit of delirium commits suicide, as much dies by his own hand as
does the individual who accidentally and unintentionally takes his own life. They each
die by their own hands, but without moral responsibility or legal blame."); see also
Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227, 230 (1869) (discussing the issue in
terms of delirium on the part of the deceased).

2019]1

COTTEN V. WILSON

803

and provided a somewhat melodramatic example of a situation in
which an individual's act of taking his own life would not be wrongful:
[I]f the party is so insane that he knows not what he is about,
or if his imagination is haunted by frightful spectres, so that
he jumps out of a high window to escape them and is killed,
etc., and a thousand other cases that might be supposed
where the death is the work of his own hands, but at the same
time an involuntary act into which he has been madly drawn
by the frenzy of the moment, not knowing or understanding
the danger on which he is rushing, and neither willing nor
intending to produce the result; in none of these cases would
he be guilty of suicide, or death by his own hands, within the
meaning of the contract.5 6
Shortly after Phadenhauer,more nineteenth century courts in the,
insurance cases began to equate excusable suicide with an individual,
acting out of a delirium or frenzy.5 7 In addition, Phadenhauerwas
frequently cited in support of the idea that recovery under a life
insurance policy was permissible where the insured had died by
suicide while insane.5 8
By the early twentieth century, the rule in insurance cases that
suicide caused by an uncontrollable frenzy or delirium was not, in fact,.
suicide for purposes of the language of an insurance policy was

56. Phadenhauer,54 Tenn. at 571-72.
57. See Parish v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 49 S.W. 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.
1898) (explaining that if the deceased had been "under the influence of insane frenzy,"
he was not responsible for taking his own life); Pierce v. Travelers' Life Ins. Co., 34
Wis. 389, 391-92 (1874) ("No self-destruction is outside of the condition unless
committed by mistake, or during a frenzy of insanity which destroys the mental
faculties to such an extent that the person is incapable of judging the effects of his
acts."). Even insurance companies were incorporating this language into proposed jury
instructions. See Hathaway's Adm'r v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335, 353 (1875)
(rejecting insurance company's proposed jury instruction to the effect that "no degree
of insanity short of delirium or frenzy, and whereby the deceased lost all power of selfwill and control, will excuse the [suicide].").
58. See Scheffer v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of U.S., 25 Minn. 534, 537 (1879);
Pagenhardt v. Metro. Ins. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 190, 191 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1897); see also
Supreme Commandery of Knights of the Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 448
(1882) (addressing the issue in the context of recovery under a benevolent association).
In 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court cited Phadenhauer as one of the leading
examples of early American decisions adopting this view. Renfandt v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 419 P.3d 576, 582 (Colo. 2018).
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common.5 9 However, there were still courts that refused to require
insurance companies to pay out in such cases. These courts typically
took the position that to permit recovery in such cases would be
60
contrary to public policy.
In order to reach this result, courts based their decision expressly
on moral grounds. Suicide was still frequently associated in judicial
61
decisions of the time with immoral conduct. But by the turn of the
twentieth century, suicide was increasingly no longer treated or
62
With suicide decriminalized in many states
prosecuted as a crime.
by this time, the arguments in favor of denying recovery on public
policy grounds were somewhat weakened. But some courts
nonetheless held that to permit recovery under a policy in such a case
63
and that such concerns
would be "subversive of sound morality"
64
overrode "all mere formal rules procedure."
The picture that emerges from the insurance cases of the time is
that suicide was an immoral act that would ordinarily bar recovery
under an insurance policy. However, the deceased policyholder was
not blameworthy where the deceased was-variously stated-insane
or acting pursuant to a frenzy, delirium, or irresistible impulse. The

deceased had not truly died by suicide in such a case. Therefore,

59. See, e.g., Peterson v. Time Indem. Co., 140 N.W. 286, 288 (Wis. 1913) (citing
the rule).
60. See Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 169 U.S. 139, 154 (1898) (holding that
even in the absence of a suicide exclusion, recovery was not permissible because
suicide was not within the contemplation of the parties and a contrary approach would
be against public policy); Davis v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 81 N.E. 294, 29596 (Mass. 1907) (citing Ritter, 169 U.S. at 154); Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dillard, 84
S.E. 656, 656-57 (Va. 1915) (basing decision "upon the soundest considerations of

&

public policy").
61. For example, in 1902, a Pennsylvania court opined that the act of suicide
may be a sin, but it is not a crime." Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Pa. D. 144, 146
(Phila. Cty. Ct. Quarter Sessions 1902); see also Blackstone v. Standard Life
Accident Ins. Co., 42 N.W. 156, 160 (Mich. 1889) (explaining that there could be no
recovery where the decedent was "conscious of the immorality of the act"); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 41, 45 (1876) (concluding that an
insurance policy could not result in forfeiture where the decedent died by suicide but
lacked an "evil will"); Van Zandt v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 169, 175 (1873)
(referring to the "the moral obliquity of the crime of suicide").
62. See Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L.
REV. 1, 99 (1985); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 2014)
(noting that the Minnesota legislature repealed the statute criminalizing suicide in
1911). But see Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992) ("Suicide . .. remains
a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other common-law states.").
63. Ritter, 169 U.S. at 154.
64. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 84 S.E. at 658.
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permitting recovery would not frustrate the public policy against
suicide.
IV. TORT LAW'S TREATMENT OF SUICIDE CASES
A. Scheffer v. Railroad Co. and the Development of the Suicide Rule
There were significantly more insurance cases in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries involving the question of whether to
permit recovery in the event of suicide than there were tort cases
involving a decedent who was alleged to have died by suicide as a
result of another's negligence. And the insurance cases clearly
influenced the tort law in this area. As the tort decisions arose more
frequently, they sometimes cited the insurance decisions in the area
and referenced the insanity/frenzy/delirium/irresistible impulse
standards that developed in the insurance decisions. 66 In some
instances, the borrowing from the insurance cases was express. 67
One obvious difference between the two lines of cases is that in
the tort cases, courts purported to base their decisions on causation
grounds. The Supreme Court's 1881 decision in Scheffer v. Railroad
Co.-discussed in the Introduction to this Essay-helped establish the
standard tort rule in suicide cases. 68 The decision focused exclusively
on the issue of proximate cause. 69 Suicide, in the Court's view, was not
the "natural and probable consequence" of the defendant's negligence,
so Scheffer's decision to take his own life became the sole proximate

65. Given the conflicting decisions on the issue of whether a life insurance policy
was void in the event an individual took his own life while insane, insurance
companies began including language to the effect that the policy was void if the
deceased took their own life whether "sane or insane." Moore v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
78 N.E. 488, 489-90 (Mass. 1906).
66. See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 88 N.E. 80, 85 (Ind. App. 1909)
(referencing the delirium/frenzy standard from insurance cases); Daniels v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 425 (Mass. 1903) (referencing the uncontrollable frenzy
standard); see also Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1921) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (referencing the insurance cases involving suicide).
67. For example, in Daniels, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
concluded the reasons underlying the decisions in the insurance cases compelled the
conclusion that a defendant in a tort action could only be liable "when the death is the
result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished in delirium or frenzy caused by
the" defendant's negligence. Daniels, 67 N.E. at 426; see also Koch v. Fox, 75 N.Y.S.
913, 921 (App. Div. 1902) ("[Tlhe rule stated in the insurance cases involving suicide,
as to what constitutes insanity, may be properly applied here.").
68. See Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
69. See id. at 251-52.
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cause of his death.7 0 American courts gradually began to cite Scheffer
for this same causation rule in subsequent tort cases involving
suicide.7 1 In doing so, however, courts also frequently referenced the
72
The reverse was also true: some
insurance decisions as well.
73
insurance decisions cited Scheffer approvingly. Thus, it appears that
decisions in the two fields influenced each other.
Scheffer did not address the possibility of a delirium or insanity
74
exception to its general rule of causation. This is somewhat odd in
that the complaint actually alleged that the injuries caused by the
train accident resulted in physical injuries, which caused the decedent
to become "disordered in mind and body" and produced "phantasms,
illusions, and forebodings of unendurable evils," which eventually
"overcame and prostrated all his reasoning powers, and induced
him . . . to take his life." 75 Instead, the decision focused solely on the
causation issue.7 6 But the delirium or insanity concept was already
77
well established in the insurance cases, and other courts, expressly
borrowing from the insurance decisions, soon began to recognize7 8 the
delirium or insanity exception in their wrongful death decisions.

70. Id. at 252.
71. See Salsedo, 278 F. at 94; Brown, 88 N.E. at 84; Long v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 931 (Neb. 1922); see also Daniels, 67 N.E. at 426
(citing Scheffer for the proposition that the representative of a deceased who dies by
suicide may not recover).
72. See Brown, 88 N.E. at 85; Daniels, 67 N.E. at 425; Arsnow v. Red Top Cab
Co., 292 P. 436, 443 (Wash. 1930).
73. See Crandal v. Accident Ins. Co. of N. Am., 27 F. 40, 47 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886)
(referencing Scheffer); Bohaker v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 102 N.E. 342,
344 (Mass. 1913) (same).
74. If anything, Scheffer seems to not recognize a decedent's delirium or insanity
as being an exception to its general proximate cause rule. See Scheffer, 105 U.S. at 252
("His insanity, as a cause of his final destruction, was as little the natural or probable
result of the negligence of the railway officials, as his suicide, and each of these are

casual or unexpected causes, intervening between the act which injured him, and his
death."). Furthermore, the Salsedo court asserted that:
[IIf the man does not kill himself deliberately, but his death is
due to suicidal mania, which results from torture, we hold that
the act of suicide cannot be regarded as the natural and
reasonable result of the torture or misconduct alleged, and that
the New York act affords no remedy.
Salsedo, 278 F. at 99.
75. Scheffer, 105 U.S. at 250.
76. Id. at 252.
77. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
78. See Brown v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 88 N.E. 80, 85 (Ind. App. 1909) ("From
the cases bearing upon the subject now being considered the rule seems to be that an
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B. The Restatement of Torts'Deliriumor Insanity Rule
In 1934, the first Restatement of Torts adopted a rule that speaks
directly to the situation in which a defendant's negligence is alleged
to have resulted in the suicide of another.7 9 Section 455 explains that
one who "brings about the delirium or insanity of another" is liable for
the harm done to that person by himself if the delirium or insanity
"prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty
or risk of harm involved" or "makes it impossible for him to resist an
impulse caused by his insanity."80 The comments make clear that the
fact that the defendant's negligence caused the decedent to suffer from
depression (or "extreme melancholia" as the authors referred to it)
that resulted in suicide was not a sufficient basis upon which to
impose liability.8l The accompanying illustrations also make clear
that the authors classified this delirium or insanity exception under.,
the heading of causation. 82
The Restatement heavily influenced the developing law in this
area, with subsequent tort decisions using some variation of this

action under the statute may be maintained when the death is self-inflicted, only
where it is the result of an uncontrollable influence, or is accomplished in delirium or
frenzy, caused by the defendant's negligent act or omission, and without conscious
volition of a purpose to take life; for then the act would. be that of an irresponsible
agent."); Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 425 (Mass. 1903) ("[T]he
liability of a defendant for a death by suicide exists only when the death is the result
of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished in delirium or frenzy caused by the
[defendant's negligence] . . . ."); see also Long v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co.,
187 N.W. 930, 933-34 (Neb. 1922) (citing Brown and Daniels and referencing the lack
of any irresistible impulse on the part of the decedent to take his life).
79. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 455 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (explaining
that "[t]he situation to which this Section is most frequently applicable is that in which
another whom the defendant's negligence has made insane does some act which
results in his own death. It is also applicable when the other's acts inflict less seri6us
harm upon him."). The original Restatement does not contain any illustrations.
However, the corresponding section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts contains
several illustrations based on earlier tort cases, some of which expressly drew from
the earlier insurance cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 Reporter's
Notes (AM. LAW INST. 1966) (citing Daniels, Koch, and Arsnow as the basis for
illustrations and a comment).
80. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 455.
81. Id. § 455 cmt. d.
82. Each illustration in Section 455 involves an explanation that the defendant's
negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Id. § 455.
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83
language or the frenzy language. As a result, the near-universal
general rule in cases involving negligence that results in suicide is
that the decedent's own act of suicide breaks the chain of causation,
unless the negligence resulted in delirium or insanity so extreme that
the decedent is unable to understand the nature of the act or its
consequences or is unable to resist the resulting impulse to take the
84
individual's own life.
The Restatement's rule has resulted in several problems.
Following the.adoption of Section 455, courts tended to treat suicide
as always constituting an efficient or superseding cause unless it
resulted from delirium or insanity. In the typical case, a court did not
explain that suicide was usually or ordinarilya superseding cause of
the decedent's death. Instead, the rule was often stated in absolute
terms, without any regard for whether suicide might actually have
85
been foreseeable under the particular facts of a case. This, in turn,

83. See, e.g., Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 8 (Ala. 2009) (stating that there was
no evidence that others caused decedent to enter a "delirium, frenzy, or rage" that
resulted in the suicide).
84. See Long, supra note 26, at 787-88 (discussing the general rule). Courts also
generally recognize that liability may also attach where the defendant knows or should
know of an individual's suicidal tendencies and has assumed an affirmative duty on
behalf of the individual, such as in the case of a hospital treating a patient. See Rural
Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 261 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (permitting
recovery where hospital was allegedly negligent in failing to use reasonable care to
prevent mental patient from taking his own life); see also McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461
A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983) (identifying other institutions who may potentially be held
liable, including jails and reform schools).
85. See Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2002) ("It is wellestablished under Illinois law that a plaintiff may not recover for a decedent's suicide
following a tortious act because suicide is an independent intervening event that the
tortfeasor cannot be expected to foresee."); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp.
1286, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("If the person commits suicide in response to a mental
condition, as distinguished from a mental illness, a prior tortfeasor, perhaps in part
responsible for that condition, will not be liable because the act of the deceased is
viewed as an independent intervening cause."); Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d
1272, 1278 (Ala. 1993) (holding that in the absence of a special relationship between
the parties, "suicide and/or deliberate and intentional self-destruction is unforeseeable
as a matter of law, and civil liability will not be imposed upon a defendant for a
decedent's suicide"); Tonn v. Moore, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0372, 2013 WL 1858773, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) ("Suicide, however, is almost universally considered a
superseding cause that is [not] foreseeable . . . ."); see also Soto v. City of Sacramento,
567 F. Supp. 662, 693-94 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that an attempted suicide is only
actionable where it is non-volitional).
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enabled courts to apply the rule in a rote fashion and to decide issues
of proximate cause-typically a jury question-as a matter of law.86
Another problem was the decision of the Restatement authors to
frame the delirium or insanity exception in terms of causation to begin
with. The issue of proximate cause has historically centered around
the

foreseeability

of

the

ensuing

result.8 7

For

example,

the

Restatement (Third) of Torts now explains that "[a]n actor's liability
is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the
actor's conduct tortious." 88 Therefore,

if the harm that directly

resulted from the defendant's conduct was different than the kind that
the defendant foreseeably risked, there should be no liability.8 9 The
fact that an individual was "insane" at the time of a suicide has no
logical bearing on the issue of whether suicide was foreseeable, except
to the extent that the defendant's negligence might foreseeably trigger
insanity.
The legal rules dating back to the Middle Ages that formed the
basis for the more modern rule regarding suicide make plain that the
delirium or insanity exception reflects a moral judgment concerning
the decedent's conduct.90 As is the case with the M'Naghten/insanity
defense in criminal law, the tort rule is based on an assessment of the
culpability of the decedent.9 1 One who does not understand the nature
and quality of an act lacks the culpability necessary for prosecution. 92
Under the reasoning of the insurance cases, the same individual who
takes his or her own life has not died by suicide for this same reason.9 3

86. There were exceptions in which courts did not draw such bright lines. See
City of Belen v. Harrell, 603 P.2d 711, 714 (N.M. 1979) ("[Ilt cannot be said that in
every case suicide is an independent intervening cause as a matter of law.").
87. See King v. Anderson Cty., 419 S.W.3d 232, 248 (Tenn. 2013) ("Foreseeability
is the crucial factor in the proximate cause test because, if the injury that gives rise to
a negligence case could not have been reasonably foreseen,. there is no proximate cause
and thus no liability despite the existence of negligent conduct." (citing Rathnow v.
Knox Cty., 209 S.W.3d 629, 633-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006))).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
89. Id. § 29 cmt. d.
90. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
91. See Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94
N.C. L. REV. 539, 552 (2016) (noting that considerations of culpability take into account
the insanity of the criminal defendant); see also Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554,
557 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that "the historic notion that suicide is an
immoral or culpable act" is a policy underlying the general rule).
92. See Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty
Jurisprudence:Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 832
(2009) (discussing differing conceptions of the insanity defense in terms of culpability).
93. See supra note 45-46 and accompanying text.
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The suicide rule and its delirium or insanity exception were expressly
derived from these legal rules. The decision of the Restatement
authors to treat the plaintiffs delirium or insanity as an issue of
proximate cause is a moral judgment regarding the blameworthiness
or responsibility of the plaintiff masquerading as an issue of
proximate cause. If the issue is truly one of blameworthiness or
responsibility, the issue of the plaintiffs delirium or insanity should
94
be addressed as an issue of comparative fault.
A final problem with the Restatement rule was the decision to
recognize the delirium or insanity exception to begin with. The
exception is based on an outdated medical understanding of suicide
and mental illness that trivializes the primary cause of suicide and
perpetuates unhelpful stereotypes of suicide and mental illness. While
there are unquestionably people who die by suicide as a result of their
psychoses or sudden impulses, depression is far more likely to be the
95
cause of suicide than psychosis. But the Restatement rule is clear
that depression (or "extreme melancholia" as the authors referred to
96
it back in 1934) resulting in suicide is not compensable. By denying
recovery in one instance and permitting it in the other, courts are
expressing a value judgment as to the blameworthiness of the
individual who dies by suicide. And it is a judgment that is based on
an outdated understanding of the causes of suicide and mental health.
Indeed, the fact that American courts in the twenty-first century
continue to use such terms as "delirium" or "rage or frenzy" in
connection with suicide is something of an embarrassment in terms of
the justice system's purported understanding of mental illness.
Ultimately, the Restatement's rule gives the law's seal of approval to
the notion that thoughts of suicide are things to be ashamed of, a
97
notion that discourages many individuals from seeking help.

94. In fairness, at the time of the first Restatement, the all-or-nothing defense of
contributory negligence was the standard rule. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 467 (AM.
LAW INST. 1934).
95. See DEPRESSION AND SUICIDE PREVENTION, CTR. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION
1 (2015), https://www.suicideinfo.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Depression-Toolkit
Print.pdf ("People with depressive illnesses carry out the majority of suicides."); Alex
Lickerman, The Six Reasons PeopleAttempt Suicide, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 29, 2010),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happiness-in-world/201004/the-sixreasons-people-attempt-suicide (stating that depression is "without question" the most
common reason why people attempt suicide).
96. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 455 cmt. d.
ORG.
HEALTH
WORLD
Depression,
97. See
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/depression

2019),
4,
(Dec.
(listing "social stigma
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Importantly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts does not retain the
delirium or insanity rule.98 The omission was most likely intentional.
The authors devoted considerable attention to the traditional concept
of proximate cause, rewriting the chapters on factual and proximate
cause, partially redefining the traditional approach to proximate
cause, and addressing a host of special causation rules. 99 Therefore, it
would be surprising if the authors intended to retain the exception but
failed to address it along with these other issues.
V. COTTEN V. WILsoN: TOWARD A NEW APPROACH IN NEGLIGENCE
CASES INVOLVING SUICIDE

Tennessee tort decisions in the twentieth century are
representative of the courts' handling of such cases more generally.
As more tort cases involving suicide began to emerge, early Tennessee
decisions quickly adopted the prevailing Restatement rule regarding
proximate cause and its delirium or insanity exception.100 But as this
Part argues, more recent Tennessee decisions have taken a different
turn that may potentially lead to a re-evaluation of the traditional
suicide rule and its exceptions.

associated with mental disorders" as one of the primary barriers to proper treatment
of depression). One article explained how stigma may impede treatment:
Research suggests that the stigma of mental illness can impair
treatment utilization in two ways: (a) through perceived public
stigma, individuals with mental illness may seek to avoid the
public label and stigmatization of mental illness by choosing not
to seek treatment or to discontinue treatment prematurely; and
(b) through internalized stigma, individuals with mental illness
may seek to avoid the negative feelings of shame and guilt about
themselves by choosing not to seek treatment.
Charlotte Brown et al., DepressionStigma, Race, and Treatment Seeking Behavior and
Attitudes, J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 350, 352 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3026177/.
98.
99.

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS chs. 5-6.

100. Like nearly every state, Tennessee recognizes exceptions to the general
causation rule involving suicide and negligence cases. See Potts v. First Peoples Bank
of Jefferson Cty., CA No. 03A01-9303-CV-00116, 1993 WL 276858, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 22, 1993) (identifying two exceptions to the general rule refusing to impose
liability for causing another's suicide).
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A. Early Tennessee Tort Law Decisions: Toward the Narrow Version
of the Suicide Rule
1. Eckerd's, Inc. v. McGhee
The first reported Tennessee decision involving the allegation of
negligence in a tort action concerning an attempted suicide was
Eckerd's, Inc. v. McGhee, a 1935 decision from the Tennessee Court of
Appeals. 0 1 In Eckerd's, a pharmacist was allegedly negligent in
102
selling poison to a minor, who then attempted to take her own life.
Consistent with the standard approach, the court focused on whether
03
the minor was insane or delirious at the time.1 According to the
court, the evidence tended to establish that the minor knew exactly
what she was doing and concluded that there were "no facts in the
record which afford a reasonable basis for an inference that she was
04
As such, the minor's own actions
insane or mentally incompetent."
105
injuries.
her
of
were the proximate cause
2. Jones v. Stewart
By the time the next case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court
in 1946, the rule that suicide was an intervening cause of an
individual's death except where the decedent acted pursuant to a
0
delirium or insanity was well established. In Jones v. Stewart,' o the
eighteen-year-old boy, of
defendant accused the deceased, an
breaking into his home and stealing $70-$75.107 The boy later hung
08
There was also
himself, "frightened with [the] charge of crime."
evidence that, following the accusation, the boy had met with friends
9
and indicated that he may be planning to take his own life.10 The
administrator of the boy's estate later brought suit, alleging that the

101. 86 S.W.2d 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).
102. Id. at 571.
103. Id. at 576.
104. Id. at 577.
105. Id. at 576-77.
106. 191 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1946).
107. Id. at 439.
108. Id.
109. Id. This allegation undercut any argument that the deceased acted pursuant
to an uncontrollable impulse insofar as it appears his actions were thought out in
advance.
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suicide was the result of the unfounded accusation made by the
defendant.110

The Tennessee Supreme Court applied the prevailing rule and
held that the plaintiffs act of hanging himself was the sole proximate
cause of his death.11 1 In support of its decision, the court quoted from
a decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in which the
decedent killed himself after allegedly being tortured by the
defendant.11 2 In that case, the' Second Circuit acknowledged that it
might be conceivable that a torture victim would attempt to take his
own life as a result of the torture, "[b]ut, if he so kills himself
deliberately, we hold that there is an intervening act of his own will
for which [th'e law] affords no remedy."11 3 This, then, represents the
hard and fast version of the rule that always treats suicide as a
superseding cause rather than a rule of thumb. The Tennessee
Supreme Court also cited an older Massachusetts decision in which
the court likewise articulated the bright-line rule that an "act of
suicide resulting from a moderately intelligent power of choice, evern
though the choice is determined by a disordered mind, should be
deemed a new and independent, efficient cause of the death that
immediately ensues."114
Thus, while the Tennessee Supreme Court may have couched its
decision in the language of foreseeability,115 it was relying heavily
upon decisions that took the view that the act of suicide is always an
independent, efficient cause of death unless the suicide resulted from
a delirium or frenzy." 6 The end result in Jones is typical of the cases
in this area. But the decision is noteworthy in that the case wasdecided on a demurrer in which the allegations were taken as true." 7
Proximate cause is typically an issue for the jury to resolve.11 8 But as
Jones illustrates, courts applying the hard version of the suicide rule
are able to apply the rule in a rote manner without any real

110. Id.
111. Id. at 441.
112. Id. at 440 (quoting Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1921)).
113. Id. (quoting Salsedo, 278 F. at 99).
114. Id. (quoting Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 426 (Mass.
1903)).
115. Id. at 440-41 (discussing whether the decedent's act of suicide was
foreseeable).
116. Salsedo, 278 F. at 100 (discussing the delirium or frenzy exception to the
general rule); Daniels, 67 N.E. at 399-400 (same).
117. Jones, 191 S.W.2d at 440.
118. See, e.g., Haynes v. Hamilton Cty., 883 S.W.2d 606, 612 (Tenn. 1994) (citing
McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991)).
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consideration of foreseeability and decide proximate cause issues as a
matter of law.
3. Lancaster v. Montesi
Lancaster v. Montesi 19 is the case discussed in the Introduction to
this Essay. In Lancaster, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied the
strict version of the suicide rule in the rote fashion typical of many
courts. Margaret Lancaster died by suicide in June of 1962 after a
sustained period of alleged physical and emotional abuse at the hands
of Louis Montesi.120 According to the complaint, Montesi had "broken
[Lancaster's] leg, burned her with a cigarette, blacked her eyes, kicked
12 1
her, and caused her to be bruised and discolored over large areas."
Lancaster had tried to escape from Montesi on multiple occasions but
122
Lancaster eventually wrote a
each time was forcibly brought home.
suicide note telling her mother that "[Montesi] has beat me enough"
123
before taking her own life.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the wrongful death case filed against Montesi following the
defendant's demurrer.1 24 The court summarily concluded, based solely
on the pleadings, that Lancaster's act of taking her own life was
unforeseeable. 125 In addition, the court concluded that the delirium or
insanity exception did not apply because the facts as alleged indicated
126
that she understood the nature of her act.
Lancaster went on to become the leading case in Tennessee, and
one of the leading cases in the nation, on the subject of suicide and
proximate cause. 127 The case has been cited numerous times by
Tennessee courts and others for the bright-line rule that suicide is an
unforeseeable, efficient cause that breaks the chain of causation in a
negligence case.1 28 At least one Tennessee decision has cited

119. 390 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1965).
120. Id. at 219.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 222.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 221-22.
127. The rule from Lancaster does not apply in the custodial setting in which a
custodian (like a jailer) knows or should know that the other person poses a foreseeable
risk of suicide. See Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
128. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998); Potts v. First
Peoples Bank of Jefferson Cty., No. 03A01-9303-CV-00116, 1993 WL 276858, at *2
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Lancaster for the proposition that "where a defendant injures another
either willfully or negligently and as a result of the injury, the injured
person commits suicide the act of suicide is, as a matter of law, an
intervening independent cause." 129 In other words, the question of
foreseeability is irrelevant, provided the decedent understood the
nature and consequences of his or her actions. The strictness of the
court's holding has not gone unnoticed, with the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals referring to Tennessee's approach to suicide cases as
embodied by Lancaster"parsimonious."o130
B. White v. Lawrence: Toward a More Reasonable Suicide Rule
More recent Tennessee decisions involving suicide have adopted a
more reasoned approach that better reflects traditional tort law
principles of foreseeability. The first case to take this approach was
White v. Lawrence, decided in 1998.131 In White, the defendant was a
physician who had been treating the decedent for several years prior
to the decedent's suicide. 132 Through his treatment of the decedent,
the physician learned that the decedent suffered from chronic
alcoholism and had said on two or three occasions that he had no
desire to live.1 33 The physician believed the patient was a "likely
candidate" for suicide.1 34 In an attempt to curtail the patient's
drinking, the physician prescribed Antabuse, a substance designed to
produce highly unpleasant physical reactions upon consumption of
even small amounts of alcohol.1 35 However, the physician did not

(Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 1993); Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1988); Inman v. Wilson, CA. No. 61, 1988 WL 9798, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
1988); Walters v. Strong, C.A. No. 744, 1986 WL 13958, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
1986); see also Watkins v. United States, 589 F.2d 214, 231 (5th Cir. 1979) (Skelton,
J., dissenting) (citing the Lancasterrule regarding suicide constituting an intervening
cause); Focke v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1325, 1351 (D. Kan. 1982) (same); State
v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579, 586 (Miss. 1968) (same); Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d
1227, 1229 n.1 (Wyo. 1972) (same).
129. Weathers, 754 S.W.2d at 78 (emphasis added).
130. MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2007); see also
Weathers, 754 S.W.2d at 78 (noting that the court in Lancaster"sustained a demurrer
even though the declaration alleged that the defendant had deliberately tormented the
decedent in a most sadistic way and that, despite the decedent's threats of and prior
attempts at suicide, the defendant continued to abuse her unmercifully.").
131. 975 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998).
132. Id. at 527.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 527 n.1.
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136
Instead,
inform the patient that he had prescribed the medication.
patient's
the
in
it
place
secretly
to
wife
he instructed the patient's
food. 137 Not surprisingly, the medication made the patient physically
sick after drinking, to the point that he went to the emergency room
for treatment. 138 After being released, the patient took his own life
39
several hours later.1
. After the decedent's wife brought a medical malpractice action
against the physician, an expert opined that '[i]t was reasonably
foreseeable for Dr. Lawrence to realize that secretly prescribing
Antabuse to an alcoholic and depressed patient under his care and
control would cause severe physical symptoms, which is a major risk
factor for suicide.""40 Another -expert similarly opined that the
physician "should have reasonably foreseen that secretly prescribing
and administering Antabuse to an alcoholic and depressed patient
would cause severe physical problems and lead to the suicide of the
patient." 14 1 Under the strict approach to the suicide rule applied by
prior Tennessee courts and others, this testimony would probably
have been treated as irrelevant. Unless the physician's actions
resulted in insanity, delirium, or frenzy, the decedent's own act of
suicide should have been treated as the proximate cause of his death.
And, in fact, this is what the Tennessee Court of Appeals decided in
holding that the physician was entitled to summary judgment:

[Where a defendant injures another either willfully or
negligently and as a result of the injury, the injured person
commits suicide the act of suicide is, as a matter of law, an
intervening independent cause if the decedent knew and
understood the nature of his or her act or the act resulted from
142
a moderately intelligent power of choice.
But on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals and articulated a rule more in keeping with traditional tort
principles of proximate cause. The court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs act of suicide may constitute an intervening cause, but "the

136.

Id. at 527.

137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139. Id. at 528.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. White v. Lawrence, No. 2997, 1996 WL 489204, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
28, 1996). (emphasis added) (quoting Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1988)), rev'd, 975 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998).
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act of suicide is not always viewed as an intervening act that relieves
the negligent actor from liability." 143 Instead, "the crucial inquiry is
whether the defendant's negligent conduct led to or made it
reasonably foreseeable that the deceased would commit suicide." 144
Thus the suicide "rule" is more a rule of thumb than a hard and fast
rule, with the ultimate focus always on whether suicide was a kind of
harm foreseeably risked by the defendant's negligence. As
importantly, the court acknowledged the limitations of previous
decisions that permitted liability only where the decedent was acting
under a delirium or insanity:
[T]he foreseeability or likelihood of a suicide does not
necessarily depend upon the mental capacity of the deceased
at the time the suicide was committed. The fact that the
deceased was not insane or bereft of reason does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the suicide, which is
the purported intervening cause, is unforeseeable.145
The court then took the opportunity to expressly overrule any
decisions that were inconsistent with this conclusion. 146 Based on the
record, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that
the suicide was the foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence.1 47
White represents a more enlightened approach to issues of causation
and suicide in torts cases. Questions as to insanity or outdated notions,
of "frenzy" or "delirium" take a backseat to traditional notions of
foreseeability under White's holding. The fact that the plaintiff was
not insane at the time does not necessarily preclude a finding that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the suicide. 148
Instead, as in other torts cases, the focus in terms of proximate cause
is simply on proximate cause. 149
Tennessee courts subsequently applied White in a somewhat
inconsistent manner. Despite White's criticism of the focus on the
delirium or insanity exception to the exclusion of foreseeability
analysis, some decisions continued to cite Lancaster prominently or

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

White, 975 S.W.2d at 530 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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1 0
focus heavily on the delirium or insanity exception. 5 But more courts
applying Tennessee law recognized that White represented a shift in
the Tennessee Supreme Court's treatment of suicide cases, through
which the focus is increasingly less on whether the plaintiff was
insane at the time of the suicide and more on whether the suicide was
15 1
foreseeable under traditional foreseeability principles.
For example, in Smith v. Pfizer, Inc., a federal court in Tennessee
15 2
Smith involved claims
noted the effect of White in negligence cases.
failure to warn
manufacturer's
the
against a drug manufacturer that
by the drug
caused
suicide
physicians about the increased risk of
153
The defendant relied upon
resulted in the decedent's suicide.
Lancaster's superseding cause rule and argued that the rule should
bar recovery absent an applicable exception, such as the delirium or
insanity exception.154 But the court noted that White had emphasized
that suicide may constitute a superseding cause, but the rule is not
absolute. 5 5 Nor, following White, does the analysis turn on whether
15 6
"[T]he touchstone," the court
the plaintiff was insane at the time.

150. See, e.g., Haynes v. Wayne Cty., No. M2016-01252-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL
1421220, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017) ("Generally, the act of suicide is, as a
matter of law, an intervening act that breaks the chain of causation and relieves a
negligent actor of liability if the decedent knew and understood the nature of his or
her act or the act resulted from a moderately intelligent power of choice." (citing
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965))).
151. See Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., 678 F. App'x 281, 287 (6th
Cir. 2017) (characterizing the litigants as complicating the issue by referencing "three
specific scenarios in which Tennessee courts have found suicide not to be an
independent intervening cause" and instead stating the determinative question as
being whether the decedent's suicide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's negligence); In re Estate of Cotten, No. M2016-02402-COA-R3-CV, 2017
WL 4083645, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2017) ("Contrary to the trial court's
holding in the instant action, applicability of the independent, intervening cause
doctrine hinges on foreseeability, rather than whether the situation fits a particular
exception."); Ramsey v. Cocke Cty., No. E2016-02145-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2713213,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2017) (citing Smith v. Pfizer, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 735,
for
748 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)) (discussing White and denying defendants' motion
593-94
580,
S.W.3d
124
River,
the
of
Bend
v.
Rains
also
see
summary judgment);
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (focusing on foreseeability of suicide). Rains is unusual in that,
like White, it seriously considers whether the decedent's suicide was foreseeable but
mistakenly characterizes White as involving a "special relationship" exception to the
general
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

rule regarding suicide and intervening cause. Id. at 594.
688 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 747-48 (citing White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998)).
Id.
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explained, "is foreseeability, not whether a given case fits into a
previously carved-out exception."1 5 7
C. Cotten v. Wilson: Two Steps Up and Two Steps Back.
In June 2019, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Cotten v.
Wilson, the latest Tennessee decision involving the issue for liability
for suicide. 158 The case involved the issue of potential liability for the
ex-boyfriend of a woman with a history of depression and other
psychiatric issues who died by suicide. 5 9 The two had a somewhat
tempestuous on again, off again relationship, and on one instance the
decedent had attempted suicide at the defendant's house. 160 The
decedent was experiencing significant personal issues in the weeks
leading up to her death. 16' During this time, the defendant, a boardcertified psychiatrist, showed the decedent a handgun he had recently
acquired.1 62 Roughly two weeks later, the decedent took her life in the
decedent's house with the gun. 163 Acting on behalf of the decedent, the,
plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in misfeasance by
keeping the firearm and ammunition in locations known and
accessible to the decedent.1 64
After the trial court and appellate court reached different
conclusions on the issue, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding as a matter of
law that the defendant's conduct was not a proximate or legal cause,
of the decedent's suicide. 6 5 The decision is somewhat surprising in
that proximate or legal cause is typically a jury question and, if, as'
White made clear, foreseeability is truly the "crucial inquiry," 16 6 there
were several facts that might lead a reasonable juror to conclude that
suicide was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances.
But putting aside the ultimate outcome, the decision, at first
glance, reads like a retreat from the earlier progress made in White.
First, the decision not only leaves the delirium or insanity exception
in place, it also unsuccessfully attempts to recast the exception as a

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 748.
576 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2019).
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630-31.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 629, 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 653.
White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.5d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998).
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benign rule about foreseeability. According to the Cotten majority, the
exception applies when it "is reasonably foreseeable that the
defendant's conduct will cause a mental condition in the decedent that
1 67
This description of the
would lead to the self-destructive act."
exception represents a substantial revision of the traditional
formulation of the exception, few if any of which focused on whether
it was foreseeable that the defendant's conduct would result in any
sort of mental injury. Recharacterizing the exception in this manner
also requires one to ignore or overlook the centuries-old history of the
exception, which reveals the exception has little to do with
foreseeability or causation.168 Moreover, it is unclear whether the
court's substitution of the phrase "mental condition . . . that would
lead to the self-destructive act" in place of the traditional "delirium or
169
insanity" language was meant to suggest a significant change.
Unfortunately, Cotten takes a concept that serves little purpose and
adds an element of uncertainty to it.
Second, despite the clear message from White that "the crucial
inquiry is whether the defendant's negligent conduct led to or made it
70
reasonably foreseeable that the deceased would commit suicide,"
not whether a case fits into a previously carved-out exception, the
Cotten majority spends an inordinate amount of time discussing these
17
previously carved-out exceptions. 1 If, in fact, foreseeability is the
touchstone, the proximate or legal cause analysis should begin with
foreseeability. Instead, the court devoted several pages to a somewhat
confusing history of the law in the area and an explanation as to why
the facts did not fit into any of the recognized exceptions before
72
turning to the issue of foreseeability.1 By focusing so heavily on the
supposed exceptions to the general suicide rule of thumb, the majority
opinion creates the potential for future courts and litigants to-in the
words of the dissenting opinion in Cotten-"get lost in the maze of the
73
suicide rule and its exceptions."1

167. Cotten, 576 S.W.3d at 643 (citing Johnson v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d
439, 442 (7th Cir. 2009)).
168. See supra Part II, Part III. The court also, contrary to the historical record,
suggests that the delirium or insanity exceptions and other exceptions to the suicide
rule developed after Lancaster. Cotten, 576 S.W.3d at 643 (stating that Lancaster led
courts to adopt exceptions).
169. Cotten, 576 S.W.3d at 643 (citing Johnson, 588 F.3d at 442). Other parts of
the decision continue to refer to the concept of "insanity." Id. at 642-48.
170.
171.
172.
173.

White, 975 S.W.2d at 530.
Cotten, 576 S.W.3d at 642-48.
Id.
Id. at 661 (Lee, J., dissenting).
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Despite these problems, there are at least two aspects of the
decision that provide cause for optimism. First is the fact that the
majority opinion largely disavows the Lancaster decision and the per
se approach to the suicide cases that underlies it. The court noted that
"[i]t is difficult to imagine that the facts in Lancasterwould yield the
same result today" 174 and "recognized that suicide is not intrinsically
a superseding intervening event that will always cut off the liability
of the defendant, even if the decedent had some ability to reason and
exercise the power of choice at the time of the suicide."1 75 Thus, the
court expressly rejected the hard and fast rule that there may be no
liability for negligently causing suicide because suicide is per se a
superseding cause. Hopefully, this will prompt courts in other
jurisdictions to reconsider their prior precedent establishing such a
per se approach.
Second, Cotten repeats the conclusion in White that foreseeability
is the touchstone in these cases just as it is with any other tort case. 176
The fact that the particular facts of a case do not fit squarely within
some exception to the general rule that suicide is generally
unforeseeable does not preclude liability.1 7 7 Instead, a court must
ultimately look to whether the defendant's conduct created a
foreseeable risk of suicide. Cotten is not the first decision to make this
point, 178 but, when combined with White, it contains one of the most
explicit discussions of the foreseeability principle in this context.

174.

Id. at 642 n.19.

175. Id. at 642.
176. Id. at 647 (citing White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998)).
177. Id.
178. See Szimonisz v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D. Or. 1982) (stating
"the standard proximate cause analysis is the appropriate analytical tool in these
circumstances"); Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 1997)
(applying factors listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 to determine if
decedent's suicide was a superseding cause); Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 729
(Ky. 2016) (rejecting the conclusion of the lower courts, in a bullying case, that suicide
is always a superseding event that breaks the chain of causation, absent an applicable
exception); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 330 A.2d 56, 61 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1974) ("[I]t is difficult to understand why in this action seeking
compensatory damages . . . special rules should be adopted."); Fuller v. Preis, 322
N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1974) ("[R]ecovery for negligence leading to the victim's death
by suicide should perhaps, in some circumstances, be had even absent proof of a
specific mental disease or even an irresistible impulse provided there is significant
causal connection."); Watkins v. Labiak, 723 N.Y.S.2d 227, 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
("Under certain circumstances, a tortfeasor may be held liable for the suicide of a
person that is the result of the tortfeasor's negligent conduct, provided the suicide is a
foreseeable consequence of the torfeasor's acts.").
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Cotten also joins the majority of state courts in the workers'
compensation context that have moved away from a rule that permits
compensation in the case of suicide only where the claimant acted
from an irresistible impulse or in a "delirium or frenzy" and in favor
1 79
While the compensation goals
of a rule based strictly on causation.
of tort law and workers' compensation differ, the rule switch in the
workers' compensation context is partly attributable to a realization
that applies with equal force in both contexts: the delirium or insanity
80
These
exception is inconsistent with principles of modern medicine.
or
committed
employee
decisions recognize that "whether an
whether
on
attempted suicide in a 'delirium or frenzy' has no bearing
18
a work-related injury caused the suicide."
CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COTTEN
Despite its flaws, Cotten represents another step in the
development of a more coherent approach toward suicide cases.
Consistent with traditional tort principles, the foreseeability of a
suicide, not whether the defendant's negligence produced "insanity or
delirium" in the decedent, should be the touchstone in such cases.
Cotten and White emphasize what should be a commonsense notion:
that suicide is not always an unforeseeable occurrence that breaks the
chain of causation flowing from a defendant's negligence. A little over
a month after the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Cotten, the
South Carolina Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion "that
suicide is an intervening act that always breaks the chain of causation
in a wrongful death action" and instead instructed that courts must
82
"apply traditional principles of proximate cause" in such cases.1
These ideas represent welcome advancements in the law in this field
and ones that future courts may rely upon as they revisit their own
prior precedents. While a decedent's act of suicide will often or even

179. See Kealoha v. Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 713 F.3d 521, 524 (9th
Cir. 2013) (explaining that the irresistible impulse rule used to be the prevailing rule
but that courts have moved away from it in favor of a chain of causation rule).
180. See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Nev. 2008) ("In
acknowledging human psychology's role in causation, this test is widely recognized to
accord with principles of modern medicine."); Borbely v. Prestole Everlock, Inc., 565
N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ohio 1991) ("[W]e find that a 'chain-of-causation' approach is more
logical and enlightened in determining cases involving a suicide that is alleged to be
the proximate result of a work-related injury.").
181. Kealoha, 713 F.3d at 524.
182. Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2018-001124, 2019 WL 3311057, at *4
(S.C. July 24, 2019).
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usually be the kind of extraordinary event that is outside the scope of
foreseeable risk created by a defendant's negligence,183 there will be
cases in which suicide was reasonably foreseeable. Outdated rules
concerning mental health should not be the focus in such cases.
Recognizing that traditional tort notions of foreseeability should
guide the analysis in these cases should also eventually lead to the
abolition of the "delirium or insanity" exception. This advancement
alone would represent an enlightened step forward in the
development of tort law. Abolishing this exception would amount to a
recognition that, to the extent possible, legal rules should not further
unfounded stereotypes and should instead reflect modern scientific
principles.
Tennessee court decisions helped shape the modern tort rules
regarding suicide. The decisions are something of a mixed bag, but
they have tended to be influential. In Cotten, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declined "to abolish the suicide rule entirely."1 84 But the
decision is nonetheless another step away from the bright-line rule
prohibiting liability against a defendant in the case of suicide and has

183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 lists several factors to consider in
determining whether an event is a superseding cause of harm, including the
extraordinary nature of the event:
The following considerations are of importance in determining
whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to
another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different
in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from
the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof
appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal
in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its
operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result
of such. a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to
a third person's act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third
person which is wrongful toward the other and as such
subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person
which sets the intervening force in motion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
184. Cotten v. Wilson, 576 S.W.3d 626, 648 n.23 (Tenn. 2019).
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the potential to influence future courts as they revisit the law in this
area.

